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Abstract
The investment funds sector has always been a major player in the financial
industry globally. As such, many countries with mature financial markets have
enacted regulations to govern the activity and management of investment funds.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted the Investment
Company Act of 1940(the Act) as an effort to restore investor confidence in
investment funds and safeguard investors from future abuses after the market
crash in 1929.2 On the other hand, emerging financial markets started to take
part in regulations in the hope to attract more investors and outside resources.
The Capital Market Authority of Saudi Arabia (hereinafter CMA) enacted the
Investment Funds Regulation (hereinafter the Regulation) in 2006, as the
Sovereign aims to turn the State into an investment powerhouse.3 Due to the
newness of the Regulation, an analysis of the Act will be helpful for the CMA to
improvise the Regulation and avoid mistakes.
This paper will first focus on four areas of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the Act with suggestions provided. It
will then offer an analysis of the Investment Funds Regulation of Saudi Arabia
and discuss areas for improvement based on the analysis of the Investment
Company Act of 1940.

2
See Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 681-82 (1969).
3
See Message from HRH Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud,
VISION 2030 KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/vision/crownmessage (last visited Feb. 01, 2020).
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I. INTRODUCTION-HISTORY OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY
ACT OF 1940
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
represented the beginning of federal securities regulation. They are still the
basic Acts regulating the purchase, sale, and issuance of securities. These
Acts protect the public in trading the traditional type of securities,
commonly referred to those issued by corporations, traded through an
exchange and over the counter market. However, the proliferation of
investment companies in the 1930s and the rapid increase in size of such
companies called for a regulatory scheme at the federal level.4 The market
crash in 1929 which led to the depression in the 1930s evidenced that there
were evils and abuses in the operation of investment funds.5 The SEC, in an
effort to restore investor confidence in investment funds and safeguard
investors from future abuse, enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940.6
The Act compels any “investment company” to register under the SEC.7
Companies registered as such are subject to the full disclosure requirements
of the Act.8
Many of the provisions in the Investment Company Act are intended
to curtail fraud and conflicts of interest. Section 36(a) under the Act
authorizes the SEC to impose injunctions on investment companies defined
by the Act. The SEC was unwilling to provide injunctive relief to prevent
stigmatizing advisors. Due to the existing conflict in the industry of gross
misconduct and misuse, injunctive relief would create a huge adverse
impact on the industry. Due to the SEC’s reluctance to bring an action,
Congress enacted Section 36(b) to authorize shareholders to bring actions
against persons associated with the fund for matters related to breach of
fiduciary duty, and lack of independence or compensation for service.
Congressional intent of the bill may be drawn by tracing congressional
and legislative records.9 However, summarizing any congressional or
legislative record is beyond the scope of this article. Despite the noted
limitation, two aspects of the congressional hearing are worth mentioning:
4

See SEC, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION, xvii (1992), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/
guidance/icreg50-92.pdf.
5
U.S. CONG. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMM., CONSUMER
PROT., & FIN., 99TH CONG., RESTRUCTURING FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE MAJOR POLICY
ISSUES: A REPORT 73 (Comm. Print 1986).
6
See What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last modified
June 10, 2013).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 681-82 (1969); See also, Richard H. Farina, John P. Freeman &
James Webster, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 732
(1969).
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1. Both the industry and the SEC agree on the issue that a set of
regulations is necessary to control abuses and evils and restore investor
confidence in the investment field. 10
2. The jointly sponsored bill received the endorsement of the SEC and
the endorsement of the industry. 11
In fact, given the rarity of a jointly sponsored bill which
simultaneously represents both the desire of the industry and the SEC to
regulate investment funds, such an accomplishment was rather
astonishing.12 Moreover, it is very unusual that the industry was willing to
subject itself to regulation. The fact that the Act reached industry and
regulatory consensus represented the very intent to protect public investor
interest. Subsequent interpretation of the Act or reconciliation of any
ambiguity presented should thus take this core value into consideration.
II. WHAT IS DEFINED AS AN INVESTMENT COMPANY?13
In order to become an investment company, the Act requires an entity
to issue securities.14 In addition to issuing securities, it has to hold and trade
securities. The Investment Company Act of 1940 outlined a subjective test
and an objective test to define an investment company.
The difficulty in defining an investment company lies in making the
distinction between an operating company and an investment company, the
latter of which is subject to SEC registration and extensive substantive
10
Senator Healy mentioned “I have heard but one witness, out of all those who
appeared here, who went on the witness stand and said that there should be no regulation.”
Hearing on S. 3580 before a Subcomm. Of the Senate Comm. On Banking and Currency,
[hereinafter Hearings] 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt.2, at 1051.
11
Hearings, supra note 10, at 1053.
12
North, supra note 8, at 684.
13
15 U.S.C. § 80a–3 (2020).
Definition of Investment Company
(a)Definitions
(1) When used in this subchapter, “investment company“ means any issuer
which—
(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading
in securities;
(B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing faceamount certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such
business and has any such certificate outstanding; or
(C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40
percentum of the value of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of
Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
14
Id.
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regulations. An operating company is defined as a parent corporation
possessing enough voting stock of another company or a subsidiary. The
operating company maintains control over the subsidiary’s course of
business and oversees its management decisions.
On the other hand, an investment company is one that conducts its
business solely on investing its pool of money in diversified securities.
The subjective test, Section 3(a)(1)(A), holds that “any issuer which is
or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading securities.”15
This definition is rather simple; if an entity holds or represents itself to the
public as a company, solely conducts investment business, then such entity
falls under the investment company definition.16
The objective test, Section 3(a)(1)(C) holds that the entity “is engaged
or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning,
holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value
of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash
items) on an unconsolidated basis.”17 In this statistical requirement, if an
entity has over 40% of its assets in securities, then it shall be labeled as an
investment company.
Notwithstanding the subjective and objective test, no company is an
investment company if it (1) is primarily engaged, directly or through a
wholly owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, in a business or businesses other
than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities;
(2) declares to be primarily engaged in a business other than that of
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities either
directly or (a) through majority owned subsidiaries or (b) through
controlled companies conducting similar types of business; or (3) is a
company all of the outstanding securities of which are directly or indirectly
owned by a company excepted from the definition of investment company
by (1) or (2) above. Any entities that fall under these categories will be
considered an operating company.
However, private funds avoid painful restrictions by forming the fund
to qualify for an exception from being considered an investment company.
Private funds like venture capital funds, hedge funds, and private equity
funds generally rely on exemptions under Section 3(c)(1) and Section
3(c)(7). In fact, ensuring the fund falls under these two exemptions is the
most important first step for a new private fund. Avoiding investment
company registration under the Act allows a fund to steer away from SEC
requirements.

15
16
17
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See SEC v. Presto Telecomm., Inc., 237 F. App’x. 198 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Section 3(c)(1)
Under Section 3(c)(1), a company that has outstanding securities
beneficially owned by less than 100 persons and is not making or planning
to make a public offering of its securities will be excluded from the
definition of an investment company under the Act. This provision is
rational and represents the core value of the Investment Company Act of
1940.
Congress enacted the Act with the intention to provide extensive
protection to investors investing in mutual funds after the 1930 market
crash.18 The Act was designed to mitigate and eliminate the condition that
adversely affects investors’ interests and public national interests as a
whole.19 If an entity qualifies to be an investment company, then it is
subjected to subsequent requirements that are intended to offer protection to
investors.
It may seem odd at first glance. Companies that satisfy this exemption
still have investors. Even though the investor pool is small, these investors
still fall under the investor definition provided by the Act. By offering such
an exemption, the Act seems to oddly exclude these investors from
protections. However, when the investor pool is small such that there are
only 100 or fewer investors, these investors have better access and control
over the fund and the investment manager.
Comparatively, when a fund has numerous shareholders spreading
across the country or even the world, it is already burdensome to gather
proxies from all shareholders, not to mention the fact that they will need to
unite together to exert influence on the fund manager. With less than 100
beneficial owners, investors could easily act jointly to maximize their
benefits. Self-help in this instance is adequate to protect these investors
from the abuses and evils the Act was designed to prevent.20
The Act provides that beneficial ownership by a company would
generally be counted as one person. Under this provision, if a public
investment company, with a large number of shareholders, holds a certain
amount of securities in a Section 3(c)(1) fund, the company as a whole will
be considered as one beneficial owner of that Section 3(c)(1) fund.
Some offshore funds may try to utilize this exemption to circumvent
18

See North, supra note 8.
Id. at 680.
20
“The major abuses which have caused these [investment companies] to fall into
disrepute may be grouped as follows:
(1) Removal of funds from control of those who supply them,
(2) Conflicting interests of management,
(3) Pyramiding,
(4) Excessive management charges and hidden fees, and
(5) Management’s use of control.”
Richard B. Tolins, Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L. REV. 77, 83 (1940).
19
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the 1940 Act. Imagine this scenario: a few investment companies, trying to
evade Investment Company requirements and involvement in investment
strategies and structure that are prohibited by the Act, jointly created a
wholly owned subsidiary fund. This fund then comprises only a handful of
beneficial owners, and each of these “owners” owns a large percentage of
the fund along with a variety of other securities in their portfolios. This, at
first glance, seems permissible under the Act. Thus, the fund is exempted
from the investment company requirements. However, these beneficial
owners are investment companies with shareholders that the Act aims to
protect. Prohibiting those investment strategies and structures were
essential for the success of the protection. The Act limited leverage
investing, for example, to mitigate the adverse effect during a market
downturn. If investment companies are able to dodge the radar of the Act,
shareholders’ interests will be left unprotected. This runs afoul of the core
value and the original intention of the enactment of the Investment
Company Act of 1940.21
The Act provided a solution to prevent circumvention. In Section
3(c)(1)(A), the Act provided an Attribution Rule. Under this rule, if an
investment company owns more than ten percent of the securities in a
3(c)(1) fund, the number of this investment company’s shareholders will be
attributed to the number of shareholders of a Section 3(c)(1) fund. That
being said, if these investment companies were to jointly create a fund to
qualify for 3(c)(1) exemption, they need to ensure, aggregately, their
shareholder number will not exceed 100. The enactment of the Attrition
Rule further guaranteed public shareholder interest. It not only prevents
collusion among investment companies, but also prohibits investment
activities that could reinforce a market crash.
Section 3(c)(7)
Other than Section 3(c)(1), private funds could also get an exemption
from Section 3(c)(7). This exemption permits a private fund to have an
unlimited number of investors provided that the securities are (1) owned
exclusively by qualified purchasers and (2) not and will not be subjected to
public offering. Under Section 2(a)(51)(A), qualified purchasers are persons
who own at least $5 million in investments.22 The reasoning for this
21

Hearings, supra note 10, at 1050.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80-2(a)(51)(A) (2006). This section
defines a “qualified purchaser” as:
I. [A]ny natural person who owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments, as defined
by the Commission;
II. [A]ny company that owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments and that is
owned directly or indirectly by or for 2 or more natural persons who are related as
siblings or spouse (including former spouses), or direct lineal descendants by birth
or adoption, spouses of such persons, the estate of such persons, or foundations,
charitable organizations, or trusts established by or for the benefit of such persons;
22
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exemption is rational: people with $5 million or more in assets are wealthy
and sophisticated investors. They are not in need of the protection offered
by the Act. Wealthy individuals considered under the Act often possess the
knowledge of investment and are willing to appreciate a more risky
investment for a more sizable return. Even if they suffer a loss through a
risky investment, they will have sufficient financial means to hedge against
the loss. Further, they will often have access to financial and legal advisors.
They are able to protect their interest and exert influence over the fund in
the event of abuses and evils. In fact, the protection they hold may even be
more effective than those provided by the Act.
Restriction on Borrowing and Senior Securities
Section 18 of the Act strictly limits open-end investment companies
from issuing multiple classes of shares. Some scholars have argued for a
more relaxed regulation on issuing senior securities and borrowing so as to
offer investors more options, tailoring to their risk-comfort level.23
However, this section will argue that the restriction on borrowing and
leverage investing has been effective. The provision offers great flexibilities
for the SEC to make amendments incorporating modern investment trends
without compromising investors’ economic interests.
To address the effectiveness of the provision, one has to first consider
the characteristics of open-end funds. Open-end funds, unlike closed-end
funds, offer redeemable securities. There is no limitation on the growth of
the fund, investors can easily opt-in and opt-out by redeeming their shares
at any time. An open-end fund cannot refuse redemption and must provide
cash payment to shareholders when requested.
Section 18(f)
Section 18(f) restricts leveraged capital structures which are usually
achieved by borrowing or issuing preferred stock. As a result, an open-end
fund cannot issue senior securities.24 A fund may, however, borrow from
banks if it maintains a 300% asset coverage for all such borrowings.
First, Congress did not impose an absolute prohibition on leverage
III. [A]ny trust that is not covered by clause (II) and that was not formed for the
specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, as to which the trustee or
other person authorized to make decisions with respect to the trust, and each
settlor or other person who has contributed assets to the trust, is a person
described in clause (I), (II), or (IV); or
IV. [A]ny person, acting for its own account or the accounts of other qualified
purchasers, who in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis, not
less than $25,000,000 in investments.
23
John Morley, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Debt, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 343, 344-45
(2013).
24
A senior security is a type of security that ranks as more superior in terms of payout.
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investing. In fact, it permits leverage investing with well-defined limits.
Initially, the SEC developed a broad concept for “senior securities” that
included any kind of indebtedness. Over the years, the SEC has permitted
trading of derivatives, so long as the fund has equivalent stock in its
portfolio or high liquid securities in a segregated account to fulfill its
obligations incurred from derivatives transactions. The segregated account
freezes certain liquid assets of the fund, rendering them unavailable for
sale. These assets are marked to the market daily, thus allowing the fund to
constantly monitor its coverage level and maintain proper risk level. This
account functions as a limit on the amount of leverage which the investment
company may undertake.25 The result of having this segregated account is
that the fund can achieve leverage through a derivatives transaction without
creating senior securities.
In general, a fund would want to involve leverage investing to take
advantage of the favorable market or borrow to obtain liquidity for
redemption. While a fund may sell its assets to increase liquidity, this
process generally takes more than a few days. A bank can provide adequate
liquidity in less than two days. However, when an open-end fund borrows,
its assets may decrease while the value of the loan stays intact. In order for
the fund to have the liquidity to meet the portfolio coverage in case of an
influx of shareholder redemption, a fund may need to sell securities during
a declining market. In that sense, the fund not only suffers exacerbated loss
from leverage investing in a declining market, it is also forced to sell assets
at lower value. This destroys investor confidence and thus leads to more
redemption, leading to more liquidity needs and creating a vicious cycle.
Moreover, leverage investing increases the volatility of the common
shareholder’s investment. Senior securities created by leverage investing
magnify losses suffered by the common shareholder during economic
downturns. These shareholders not only suffer share value shrinkage, but
are also punished for assuming more risk in their investment due to this
inferior capital structure. During fund liquidation, where senior securities
receive priority payouts, junior capitals run the risk of losing even their
principal payments. The heavy restriction is thus effective in preventing
huge losses and further represents Congress’s attempt to restore public
confidence in mutual funds after the market crash in 1929.
III. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REQUIREMENT
One of the major provisions in the Act is the requirement for
independent directors. Under the Act, the board of a mutual fund must
contain a minimum percentage of independent directors. Furthermore, the
Act outlines very detailed criteria in determining the independence of an
independent director. This provision is distinctive in that no other federal
25
TAMAR FRANKEL & KENNETH E. BURDON, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION
283-84 (5th ed. 2015).
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statutes mandate a minimum requirement on independent directors.
This provision seems logical at first, considering the large number of
dollars at stake.26 According to research conducted by the ICA, registered
investment companies manage twenty-one percent of household financial
assets in the United States.27 Before the enactment of the Act, absent an
independent director requirement, directors were usually affiliates selected
by fund advisers. As such, these directors tended to vote in favor of the
advisers in board meetings, providing advisers the chance to use fund assets
to advance their own financial interests at the expense of the shareholders.
Thus, independent directors are necessary to prevent advisers from abusing
their positions and to ensure public economic interest.
Under present law, a mutual fund board must have no less than forty
percent of directors that are “disinterested” persons in the company. A
director is an interested person in the company if: that director is inter alia
affiliated with the company, its investment advisor, or its principal
underwriter; has acted as, been employed by, or partnered with legal
counsel for the company in the preceding six months; has loaned money or
property to the company or its adviser’s accounts in the preceding six
months; or is within the “immediate” family of a person who is affiliated
with the company.28 Additionally, an independent director of an investment
company cannot have a material business or professional relationship with
the investment companies, its investment adviser, or its principal
underwriter, or have been a partner or employee of a person who has done
so, within the past two fiscal years.29 In simple words, independent
directors cannot own a single share of the investments or business of the
investment adviser. This concept passes through to sub-advisers.
Everything that relates to an investment adviser will relate to sub-advisers.
While this provision protects investors’ financial interests and fends
off potential abuse, it is both overinclusive and underinclusive.
Underinclusive
Congress’s rationale when drafting this provision was that directors
26

“The net asset for all U.S. investment companies amounted to $21.4 trillion by the
end of 2018.” INVESTMENT INV. CO. INST., 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 32 (59th
ed. 2019), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2019_factbook.pdf.
27
Id. at 34.
28
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(19)(A)(i)—(vi) (2000); see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (Defining an
‘affiliated person’ as “(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding
with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other
person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are
directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other person;
(C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such
other person”).
29
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(19)(A)(vii).
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who are not interested persons pose less risk of conflicts of interest. Thus,
these directors strengthen independent checks on the management board
and its investment decisions. Congress and the SEC, on multiple occasions,
concluded that a relationship is material if it influences the director to act in
a manner that advances interests other than those of the shareholders. House
committee reports declaring “substantial financial . . . relationships”30
further confirmed Congress’s belief that a material relationship is
characterized by monetary elements. However, self-interest often lacks
direct financial motives. Relationships may not be driven purely by
pecuniary incentive, but nonetheless lead one to fame or business
connections which, in turn, result in advancements in other facets.
People tend to make numerous business connections through
participation in clubs. Under the current law and Congress’s interpretation
on materiality, such business connections do not raise the matter of
interestedness. However, people who are able to join luxury sport clubs are
often successful, wealthy business individuals. Money may not be the most
important element in their career pursuits. Participating in the decisionmaking of an investment company allows them to secure more societal
influence and increase their prestige. While the lack of monetary affiliation
between the director and the adviser may allow the director to be
independent in his judgment, there remains the risk of potential abuse.
A director may be more prone to side with the investment adviser in
board decisions because of the established relationship, maintenance of that
connection, or the desire to be recommended by the adviser for future,
unrelated business opportunities. Further, a ‘golf buddy’ would not have
been invited by the adviser to take a board seat if that individual’s vision
did not align with that of the adviser.
The Act requires independent directors to select other independent
directors; however, the advisers select the group of independent directors
when the fund is initially formed. Thus, subsequent independent directors
selected by ‘golf buddies’ of the adviser are not entirely independent. One
may argue, due to criticism of ‘invite your dentist,’ that independent boards
are more often filled with business school faculties in modern days.31
However, an occasional celebrity figure or sports legend could still end up
in a board seat.32 While celebrities or sport legends may know nothing
about the financial industry, academics often lack practical business
experience and tend to err on the side of being too theoretical in their
decisions. Excessive theoretical understanding of the industry will likely
lead to impracticality and, in the end, impair the interests of the fund.
30
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, H.R. 91-1382, 91st Cong., at 13
(1970).
31
James Sterngold, Why Mutual Fund Guardians are Failing, WALL ST. J. (June 14,
2012, 5:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB7000142405270230381540457733625153
4419564.
32
Id.
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Overinclusive
Under the statutory language, an interested person is one who has
executed any transaction with the investment company or the adviser of
interest in the investment company.33 Further, institutional investors that
own 5% or more of a fund are affiliated parties, and the Act prohibits
transaction with such affiliates. Thus, a person is interested if he or she has
transacted with an affiliate.
Before the statute’s enactment, advisers were involved in larceny and
embezzlement, while directors were reinforcing the misconduct due to their
personal and financial ties with the advisers.34 The SEC was unwilling to
issue injunctive relief out of concern that it would stigmatize investment
company advisers.35 Due to the lack of action from the SEC, Congress
implemented the independent director rule and interested person standard to
ensure director independence and to thwart potential conflicts of interest.36
While this rule was effective in safeguarding shareholders’ interests at the
point of enactment, the rule needs to be updated to encompass modern
investment trends.
The interested person standard did not anticipate the emergence of
fund families. Since this standard applies to sub-advisers, an independent
director for a fund group that has 100 funds, which each has 50 subadvisers, cannot have any economic interest with the advisers of those 100
funds or the 5000 sub-advisers. Consider mega-fund managers like The
Blackstone Group. If it were to become a sub-adviser of Allstate Insurance,
Blackstone may encounter a list of thousands of potential affiliates. If
Allstate needs to elect an independent director for one of its investment
funds, its selections will be very limited due to the large list of affiliates.
It is inevitable that funds as large as The Blackstone Group have a
broad network and do business in every industry. The complex nature of
these funds’ transactions also requires investment decisions informed by
knowledgeable business experts. Typically, individuals with specialized
expertise have extensive business and financial connections. An
individual’s economic interests with the advisers/sub-advisers may be only
one investment in his or her diverse portfolio. This business connection
may not even amount to a material level with respect to the individual’s
whole investment profile. Crossovers and overlaps are inevitable when the
financial industry is so interconnected. Under the current standard, a
negligible economic interest in the adviser’s or sub-adviser’s business leads
to a conclusion of lack of independence and impaired judgment. While the
fund may seek exemption from the SEC, filing for an exemption is usually
33

15 U.S.C. § 80a–2(a)(19)(A)(v).
North, supra note 8, at 678; Walter Werner, Protecting the Mutual Fund Investor:
The SEC Reports on the SEC, COLUMBIA L. REV. 1, 4 (1968).
35
H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 142-43 (1966).
36
North, supra note 8, at 678; Werner, supra note 32, at 7.
34
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a time-consuming process.
The existence of such a strict standard deters potential candidates from
taking board seats in fear of jeopardizing their own business interests or
violating SEC regulations.
Recommendations
The independent director rule permits “friends” of the advisers to be
elected while prohibiting individuals with negligible business interests from
taking positions. In order to mitigate the risk of including one’s ‘golf
buddies’ and impairing board decisions, the SEC should prohibit some
relationships not driven purely by pecuniary interest and expand materiality
to include relationships that lead to self-serving goals at the expense of
shareholders’ interests.
Consider Delaware’s statute governing interested directors, under
which transactions are not void if the company can provide full disclosure
and obtain good faith authorization from shareholders.37 Similarly, full
disclosure and shareholder ratification could cleanse any taint of conflicting
interest from a potential ‘golf buddy’ candidate.
One may argue shareholder ratification is costly; however, shareholder
ratification may not always be exercised. Such a measure only provides
shareholders the right to exercise if they are concerned about a ‘golf buddy’
relationship after full disclosure. The shareholders could, in holding with
requirements under Rule 14a-8,38 request a shareholder vote before the
candidate assumes office. While Rule 14a-8(i)(8) allows a company to omit
a shareholder proposal if it relates to the election of officers, shareholder
requests regarding the election of independent directors should be exempted
from Rule 14a-8(i)(8). One may also argue that, given the redeemable
nature of a mutual fund, a shareholder could simply redeem the shares and
abandon his or her stake due to concern about a director; such shareholders
would not exercise their ratification rights. However, a shareholder
ratification provision could function as a psychological barrier to directors
that intimidates those non-pecuniary but interested relationships mentioned
above. This ratification process also thwarts future shareholder litigation
concerning an interested director.
When available, shareholder ratification, or the lack of a proposal for
ratification, demonstrates that the election of the individual was in the
interest of a majority of shareholders.

37
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2006) (Stating that “[t]he material facts as to the
director’s or officer’s relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are
disclosed or are known to the stockholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or
transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the stockholders[.]”).
38
17 CFR § 240.14a-8. (Hereinafter “Rule 14a-8”).
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IV. DE MINIMIS FACTOR TEST
In addition, the SEC should impose a de minimis standard to Section
2(a)(19) to address the overinclusive problem which unnecessarily
disqualifies individuals from serving as independent directors. This section
proposes the adoption of a factor test to determine the independence of a
potential candidate who has economic interest with the adviser or subadviser. Under such a standard, independent directors and the board would
be provided business judgment rule protection if they can provide wellreasoned justification and evidence for each factor when determining the
directors’ independence.
A director who has economic interests with an adviser or sub-adviser
should still be considered independent given:
i) the beneficial interest the potential candidate owns is immaterial in
relation to the entire portfolio; such immateriality should be a subjective
judgment with respect to the potential independent director.
The prohibition on material and beneficial relationships arises from the
concern of judgment impaired by such relationship. However, if the
beneficial interests do not appear material from the candidates’
perspectives, their judgments are unlikely to be impaired based on the
interests they have with the advisers. Coming up with a numerical percent
is outside the scope of this paper. However, potential candidates must be
able to demonstrate that the concerned beneficial interests constitute a
minor portion of their total assets.
ii) the potential director’s economic interest with the adviser/subadviser is minor when compared to the whole company’s (company of the
adviser or sub-adviser) interest.
The question posed when measuring this factor is whether the
potential director’s ownership of the adviser’s or sub-adviser’s company is
material with respect to the company as a whole. In this case, materiality
can be interpreted both from a subjective and objective standard.
Subjectively, the company should not view the director’s economic interest
in the company as material compared to the rest of the shareholders.
Objectively, the economic interest that a potential director has in the
company should be minor, such that substantial economic gain cannot be
derived from that particular interest by favoring the adviser in business
judgments as a director.
iii) attenuation of the economic interest.
Currently, if a partner in the Hong Kong office of a law firm had acted
as a legal adviser for the adviser in the prior year, a partner in the New
York office of the same law firm would be disqualified from serving as an
independent director. This standard holds even if the New York partner has
never encountered the Hong Kong partner and has no knowledge of the
previous advisory relationship. However, this type of attenuated interest is
not the type of interest that Congress intended to prohibit when it adopted
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the provision. If the interest is attenuated such that it does not rise to
materiality with respect to the potential candidate, it is unlikely that
judgment will be impaired.
iv) level of happenstance of the economic interest given the nature of
the potential candidate’s investment strategies.
If investing in a diverse set of securities is the potential independent
director’s ordinary course of investment, it is likely that an economic
interest with the adviser is merely incidental to the director’s portfolio
investment strategy.
No factor shall be considered more important than the others. In fact,
all factors should be considered interconnected. For example, factor (iv)
alone cannot determine the independence of a director without considering
the substantive impact of factors (i) and (ii).
Because this proposal substantively relaxes the current standard, one
may worry that it could lead to abuses akin to those prior to the enactment
of the Act. However, mutual funds are registered companies under state
law. As such, the independent board is governed by fiduciary duties under
state corporate law. Corporate fiduciary duties require the independent
board to exercise diligence in its judgments. As such, a potential candidate
must provide reasonable justifications backed by evidence for each factor.
The independent board, bound by corporate fiduciary duties, then
scrutinizes the justifications and exercises its best judgment in voting.
12b-1 fee; Maybe it is time to end it
In 1980, the SEC adopted rule 12b-1 to permit open-end management
investment companies to bear expenses associated with the distribution of
their shares.39 Rule 12b-1 thus passes certain selling costs to shareholders
through charges against fund assets.40 This creates a conflict of interest:
managements are allowed to pass costs that benefit themselves to
shareholders who receive no gain from the process.
The SEC initially implemented a 12b-1 fee to encourage sales and
stimulate fund asset growth, benefiting both shareholders and management.
As the fund grows larger, the lower the operating cost is for a fund, thus
achieving economy of scale. For example, if fund assets grow larger, the
fund possesses more negotiation power to reduce the percentage of
management fee paid to the management. Meanwhile, with the percentage
fall on the management fee, shareholders will be able to realize a larger
percentage of return. This sounds like a double win situation. Yet after
many years of implementing the rule, there is no appearance of a double
win.41 Rule 12b-1 failed to generate positive financial benefit to fund
39
Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment Company Act Rel.
No. 11414 (Oct. 28, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 73898 (Nov. 7, 1980).
40
Id.
41
Id.
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shareholders. Moreover, it did not reduce expenses the way the SEC
expected when it drafted the provision.
A study conducted by the SEC compared funds of similar size with
and without 12b-1 plans. It showed that the average expense ratio for 12b-1
funds is higher than that of non-12b-1 funds.42 In other words, 12b-1 fees
did not reduce fund expenses, even after subtracting the 12b-1 fees from
total expense. Further, the study found that both 12b-1 and non-12b-1 funds
exhibit economies of scale in expenses, but the scale is not produced by a
lower 12b-1 fee. In fact, the 12b-1 fee changes minimally as the fund grows
larger.
A possible explanation for this failure could be attributed to the longterm impact of a fee. Long-term investors may be less drawn to a 12b-1
fund that “permits existing shareholders to pay for bringing new
shareholders into the fund.”43 One may argue that the growth induced by a
12b-1 fee can generate economies of scale and thus offset the 12b-1 fee.44
However, it is unlikely that a fund may grow to the size needed in order to
achieve economies of scale in a short period of time. In fact, it would take
an equity fund 62 years to generate a sufficient scale of economies to offset
the 12b-1 fee.45 Given a shareholder does not retain their capital in a single
fund for such a long period, the scale generated by a 12b-1 fee does not
provide the shareholder any significant financial benefit.
Ironically, non-12b-1 funds have also experienced positive annual
growth of approximately 4%, comparable to the 4% additional growth
attained by 12b-1 funds.46 If a fund is able to attain similar growth without
implementing the fee, it would generate fewer expenses and thus higher
equity per share. Shareholders may be better off in a non-12b-1 fund.
As technology advances, investors are becoming more comfortable
with online platforms. With the increase in financial information
transparency and the ease to access analysis online, the role of the broker is
becoming less prominent. Modern investors intending to invest in funds
would not search for “the best broker” in a search engine. In fact, fund
characteristics and objectives are apparent with a few simple clicks on the
internet. Investors are able to make decisions according to their investment
preferences with the available information online. They are able to enroll in
a mutual fund without any outside assistance.
Unlike when 12b-1 was enacted, a modern-day broker is not bringing
in as many new assets to a fund. With the reduced need for a broker to
42
LORI WALSH, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS TO FUND SHAREHOLDERS OF 12B-1 PLANS: AN
EXAMINATION OF FUND FLOWS, EXPENSES AND RETURNS, 12 (2004).
43
Flanagan, Ronald Kindschi & Spectrum Admin., Inc., SEC Release No. 29-315, 71
SEC Docket 1415, 1417 (Jan. 31, 2000).
44
Walsh, supra note 41, at 12.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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expand the fund, a 12b-1 fee seems rather dispensable. In all, 12b-1 fees
should be eliminated.
V. SAUDI ARABIA INVESTMENT FUNDS REGULATION
The History
Investment funds initially started in commercial banks in most Islamic
countries. However, such funds did not receive much enthusiasm from
investors. Muslim investors fear that participation in such funds runs the
risk of violating Sharia Law, which prohibits trading with interest or
investment in alcohol, gambling, etc. With the establishment of Sharia
supervisory boards to certify Islamic financial products as being Sharia
compliant, Sharia compliant investment funds started to emerge in
commercial banks. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in fact, was the first to
enter the mutual fund field.47 The national bank of Saudi Arabia, currently
called NCB Capital Co., founded the first mutual fund in December 1979.48
However, mutual fund regulations were not issued until the beginning of
1993.49 By the end of 1998, the number of investment funds reached 114.50
To date, Saudi Arabia is considered the largest market for mutual funds in
terms of market share,51 representing SR 290,141.10 million (equivalent to
approximately $77 billion in U.S. Dollars).

Image from Capital Market Authority of The Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia Annual Report 2018.
The Capital Market Law authorizes the Capital Market Authority to
regulate the activities taken by investment funds, portfolio managers, and
47
Mutual Funds, CAP. MKT. AUTH. OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 2, https://
cma.org.sa/en/Awareness/Publications/booklets/Booklet_3.pdf.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Mohammad M. Hariri, Sharia Compliant investment funds in Saudi Arabia-A Critical
Perspective, 32 (2013) (unpublished D.Sc. dissertation, University of Dundee) (on file with
the University of Dundee Library).
51
Id.
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fund advisors.52 The Capital Market Law requires the CMA set forth
regulations, rules, and instructions that govern the structure and operation
of investment funds. The regulatory framework for investment funds has
significantly developed since its first enactment.53 The approach taken by
the Capital Market Authority, the body which regulates capital markets
activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is both risk-based and
compliance-based.54 Nonetheless, more transparency and procedural
improvements are needed to provide a more proper regulatory scheme for
the CMA and the industry.
In order to better assess the procedure, one needs to understand that
the CMA was given rule-making authority and enforcement power by
authority of the Kingdom to protect investors, reduce systemic risk, ensure
fair and efficient trading, and transparency of the capital markets.55 In that
sense, the principles behind the Investment Fund Regulation enacted by the
CMA is analogous to that of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Restriction on Borrowing
The Investment Fund Regulations has two provisions which
specifically discuss borrowing. Under Article 40(h), the borrowing of a
public fund must not exceed 10% of its net asset value. Providing the
primary objective is to protect investors and promote a more transparent
environment for investors, this limitation seems to be effective. However,
this limitation is in need of refinement.
The problem presented with this limitation is that the provision did not
provide a coverage requirement for such borrowing.
Under a booming economy, leverage investing allows investors to
magnify their return. This can be shown by a simple calculation: suppose an
investor owns $100 and borrows $50. Under an economic boom, an
investor is able to obtain 10% of the return. The investor will receive a
return of $165 with leverage compared to only $110 without leverage.
However, if the mutual fund falls, the investor will lose twice as much with
leverage. Existing laws do not offer any protection to the investor.
The Investment Fund Regulations provide no clear liquidity
requirement. While the Regulation requires all money market funds to
52
See CAPITAL MARKET LAW, CAP. MKT. AUTH. 16, https://cma.org.sa/en/Rules
Regulations/CMALaw/Documents/CMALaw.pdf.
53
See IMF, SAUDI ARABIA: FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM UPDATE–
DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF OBSERVANCE OF THE IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 9 (2011).
54
Id.
55
See Capital Market Authority, CAP. MKT. AUTH., https://cma.org.sa/en/AboutCMA/
Pages/AboutCMA.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
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ensure liquidity equaling to at least 10% of the fund’s net asset,56 such
requirement is not applicable to all open-end funds. The Regulation did
require fund managers use their best efforts to ensure that the investment
fund is sufficiently liquid in order to meet anticipated redemption requests;
it did not provide a uniform standard.
Without a coverage threshold, a fund manager lacks the information to
properly assess the risk of borrowing. As previously discussed, with a
coverage test requirement, a fund is able to maintain the value of assets
compared to the value of the loan. In case of an economic downturn, a fund
may be forced to sell its assets to meet the portfolio coverage requirement.
With such, a lot of American mutual funds will choose not to borrow.
Similarly, the CMA should adopt more transparent and clear guidance that
assists Saudi open-end funds to better assess the risk and the need for
borrowing.
Another provision concerning borrowing is Article 64. This provision
requires a fund manager to use his or her best effort to retain sufficient
liquidity to meet redemption requests. If the manager finds that, for the
benefit of the fund, the money available in the fund is insufficient to meet
redemption requests, the manager may borrow. Borrowing to meet
redemption requests, however, is not subject to the 10% limit set out in
Article 40(h).57 This provision directly conflicts with the purpose of
enactment of Article 40(h). More severely, it is contradictory to the
principles behind the whole Investment Fund Regulations.
An authority restricts public funds from borrowing to protect
investors’ interest and prevent potential market crashes. Such prohibition
requires the fund manager to actively monitor the liquidity of a fund and
sell or purchase assets as needed. As such, it imposes a limit on the level of
risk a fund is able to take, which in turn ensure market stability and investor
confidence. However, this cannot be achieved if fund managers are able to
borrow from banks to meet redemption requests.
Article 64 serves as a safe harbor for investment fund managers. This
creates the potential for them to exploit their very own responsibility as
fund managers. First, they do not need to continuously monitor liquidity to
ensure adherence to the background principles of the Regulations. Second,
they are able to borrow and there is no limit on the borrowing, which opens
the door for them to be more reluctant in their investment decisions. Third,
and the most important point, shareholders who redeem faster than others
during an economic downturn are benefiting at the expense of the
remaining shareholders. Shareholders who remain in the fund end up facing
lower assets but higher debt.
56
Investment Funds Regulation, CAP. MKT. AUTH. 30 (2006), https://cma.org.sa/en/
RulesRegulations/Regulations/Documents/IFRs%20Regulations-%20Final%20English.pdf.
57
Id. at 37.
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Recommendations
In light of Article 40(h) and Article 64(b) and (c), it appears that Saudi
Arabia does not have a concrete concept for fund borrowing. Its approach is
deficient because it opens the gate for potential abuses and does not offer
safe protection for investors. In addition to the current 10% borrowing
limit, the CMA needs to impose a definite liquidity requirement. As the
exact number for coverage requirement demands extensive numerical
analysis and market research, it is thus not within the scope of this article.
Nonetheless, the CMA should consider the U.S. approach of requiring an
asset coverage requirement of 300%. While one may argue that the 10%
limit in Article 40(h), by itself, functions as an asset coverage requirement,
Article 64(c) provides backdoor access to circumvent this coverage
requirement. To provide a better understanding and clear regulatory
framework for fund managers, the two provisions, Articles 40(h) and 64(c),
concerning borrowing should be viewed in conjunction with each other,
such that an asset coverage requirement, if legislated, can be applicable to
both borrowing to invest and borrowing to meet redemption requests.
Power of the Authority to Remove and Replace the Fund Manager/Fund
Board in a Public Fund
Similar to the U.S. Investment Companies Act of 1940, the Investment
Fund Regulation in Saudi Arabia provides tremendous power and authority
to the CMA. Distinct from other regulatory frameworks, the Regulations
provide the CMA the power to remove and replace public fund managers.58
58

Article 20: Power of the Authority to Remove and Replace Fund Manager.
Investment Fund Regulations of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Article
provides:
a. The Authority shall have the power to remove a fund manager in relation to a
particular investment fund and to take any action it deems appropriate to appoint a
replacement fund manager for that investment fund or to take any other measures
it deems necessary in the event of:
1) the fund manager ceasing to carry on management activities without
notification to the Authority under the Authorised Persons Regulations;
2) the cancellation by the Authority of the fund manager’s relevant
authorisation(s) to carry on management activities under the Authorised
Persons Regulations;
3) a request by the fund manager to the Authority to cancel its relevant
authorisation to carry on management activities;
4) the Authority believing that the fund manager has failed, in a manner
which the Authority considers material, to comply with the Capital Market
Law or its Implementing Regulations;
5) the death, incapacity or resignation of a portfolio manager who manages
the assets of the relevant investment fund, if no other registered person
employed by the fund manager can manage the assets of the relevant
investment fund or the assets of the funds managed by the portfolio manager;
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One may argue the Saudi investment fund industry is still in its youth, thus
more authoritative monitoring is necessary to ensure its healthy
development. However, this provision provides excess authority to the
CMA without giving concrete guidance to investment fund managers.
First, under subparagraph 4 of paragraph a, the authority can remove a
manager from his or her position as long as the authority holds a belief that
the manager fails to comply with associated laws in a manner that the
authority considers material.
This provision provides two considerations for removal. One, the
manager fails under the authority’s belief; two, the failure is material, under
the authority’s belief. While failure and material seem easy to understand, a
clear interpretation is urgently needed. The Regulation also falls short of
enforcing a concrete standard outlining the “authority’s belief.” Without
such a standard, an investment fund manager will be constrained in
performing his duties in fear of crossing the line of the authority’s beliefs.
The absence of concrete definitions also leads to transparency issues.
As there is no standard or definition, it provides great leeway for the
Authority in their judgments. The provision not only opens the gate for
preferential treatments, but it also gives rise to potential bribery. A fund
manager can be easily removed by the authority for reasons completely
irrelevant to a material failure to comply, but simply due to personal
conflict with the authority officials. Once fluidity exists in defining material
failure in the authority’s belief, a lot can be done by the fund manager in
private to obtain a more favorable interpretation. This runs afoul of the
principles behind enactment.
A regulation is effective when it imposes a uniform standard on all
participants in the industry. The legislation can then observe and obtain
feedback over the years from the market. Legislators then draft
amendments in accordance with the feedbacks and observations. These
cannot be achieved if a regulation merely functions as a display. Not only
does it prevent governing bodies from making improvements, but it also
6) Issuance of a special fund resolution by unitholders of a close ended fund;
or
7) any other event determined by the Authority on reasonable grounds to be
of sufficient material.
b. Notice of any event described in sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph (a) of this
Article shall be provided by the fund manager to the Authority within (2) days of
its occurrence.
c. If the Authority exercises its power pursuant to paragraph (a) of this Article,
the relevant fund manager shall co-operate fully in order to help facilitate a smooth
transfer of responsibilities to the replacement fund manager during the initial (45)
day period after the appointment of the replacement fund manager. The fund
manager shall where necessary and applicable and at the discretion of the
Authority, novate all of the contracts relating to the relevant investment fund to
which it is a party to the replacement fund manager.
Id. at 13-14.
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threatens the public interest which the Regulation aims to protect. As a
result, investors will lose confidence in investing in the market.
Ensuring investor confidence is especially crucial to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia as it has the vision of transforming the Kingdom into a global
investment powerhouse.59 The fact that the market is relatively new is
already holding back some investors. If the Kingdom cannot provide
adequate protection to investors, the Kingdom not only will run the risk of
capital outflows but will also encounter difficulty in attracting inflow of
foreign capital.
The Kingdom is currently only open to foreign institutional investors.
Institutional investors who will have the capital to venture into the Saudi
market are experienced financial players in mature markets. Their
expectations of regulatory safeguards will be critical. Any attempt to sketch
thorough guidance and an inclusive definition for “material” that qualifies
“authority’s belief” under the Regulation is outside the scope of this article.
It is also best to leave the task to the CMA, as it retains the best
understanding of the Kingdom’s interest. Nonetheless, a suggestion for the
governing bodies in the Kingdom: in order to reassure investors and gain
their confidence, an amendment for a transparent and comprehensive
regulatory provision is critical.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of Section 2(a)(19)(A)(vii) from the Investment Company Act
of 1940 and Article 20(a)(4), both regulatory bodies do not have
comprehensive understandings of “material.” The U.S. interpretation of
“material” in the independent director context has proven to be both
overinclusive and underinclusive. Nonetheless, the Capital Market
Authority should refer to the Investment Company Act of 1940 when
addressing the issue raised with borrowing under the Regulation.
59

The first pillar of our vision is our status as the heart of the Arab and Islamic
worlds. We recognize that Allah the Almighty has bestowed on our lands a gift
more precious than oil. Our Kingdom is the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, the
most sacred sites on earth, and the direction of the Kaaba (Qibla) to which more
than a billion Muslims turn at prayer.
The second pillar of our vision is our determination to become a global investment
powerhouse. Our nation holds strong investment capabilities, which we will
harness to stimulate our economy and diversify our revenues.
The third pillar is transforming our unique strategic location into a global hub
connecting three continents, Asia, Europe and Africa. Our geographic position
between key global waterways, makes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia an epicenter
of trade and the gateway to the world.
Message From HRH Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Abdulaziz Al-Saud, VISION KINGDOM
OF SAUDI ARABIA 2030, https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/vision/crown-message (last visited
Sept. 21, 2020).
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Multiple regulatory frameworks have attempted to provide more clear
understandings of “material.” Nonetheless, this remains a complicated task
even in mature financial markets like the United States. Saudi Arabia, in
endeavoring to refine its regulation, should examine the deficit in the U.S.
system. It should examine the SEC’S failures and consider
recommendations provided to the SEC to address the failures. By doing so,
the CMA can avoid creating ambiguities and loopholes. It can also ensure it
avoids mistakes made by mature markets in the past. With a more mature
financial regulatory scheme, the Kingdom will further stimulate economic
growth and attract quality foreign capital.
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